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Hybrid Warfare:  
Battlegrounds of the Future
VK Ahluwalia
The most distinctive change in the character of modern war is the blurred 
or blended nature of combat. We do not face a widening number of distinct 
challenges but their convergence into hybrid wars.1
— Frank G Hoffman
In the 34-day Israel-Hezbollah War of 2006, Israel’s Army, one of the 
most technologically advanced militaries of the world, was pitted against 
the fundamentalist Shia Muslim organisation Hezbollah in southern 
Lebanon. Hezbollah, a non-state armed group, was armed with high-tech 
weaponry and other disruptive technologies, such as Precision Guided 
Munitions (PGMs), anti-tank missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAVs) that are traditionally used by the regular forces of a country. 
Hezbollah forces shot down Israeli helicopters, severely damaged a patrol 
boat with a cruise missile and destroyed a large number of armoured tanks 
by firing guided missiles from hidden bunkers.The group’s guerrillas 
stood their ground with their hi-tech weaponry and guerrilla tactics. 
They operated in a decentralised manner at the tactical levels, from both 
their urban and mountain bases, and shocked the Israeli Defence Forces 
(IDF) with their conventional-cum-unconventional forms of warfare. 
Israel accepted that it committed a mistake in not adequately preparing 
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for a ‘hybrid’ conflict with Hezbollah.2 US Army Chief General George 
W. Casey said that a new type of war that would become increasingly 
common in the future would be “a hybrid of irregular warfare and 
conventional warfare.”3
Similar to this, in the proceedings of the 2009 Hybrid Warfare 
Conference, Dr. Russell Glenn, Director, Plans and Policy, G-2, in the 
US Army Training and Doctrine Command, provided a comprehensive 
definition for a hybrid threat to apply to the tactical, operational, and 
strategic levels of war. He defined a hybrid threat as an: 
…adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs some 
combination of political, military, economic, social, and information 
means, and conventional, irregular, catastrophic, terrorism, and 
disruptive/ criminal conflict methods. It may include a combination of 
state and non-state actors.4
Although there are ample examples of Generals and rulers of the 
ancient times who have used both regular and irregular tools of warfare 
against their adversaries at strategic and tactical levels, the term ‘hybrid 
warfare’ appeared at least as early as 2005. It was subsequently used to 
describe the strategy and tactics employed by Hezbollah in the Israel-
Hezbollah War of 2006. Since then, the term ‘hybrid’ has dominated 
much of the discussion about modern and future warfare, to the point 
where it has been adopted by senior military leaders and promoted as a 
basis for modern military strategies.5 Today, in the digital age, there is 
a wide range of hybrid tools available which enable nations to achieve 
their objectives at minimal cost, albeit without even fighting an actual 
war. Therefore, hybrid warfare/threats are the new battlegrounds of 
the future, as they pose a huge challenge to security and elements of 
national power. The aim of this paper is to briefly discuss the genesis of 
hybrid warfare, the various terminologies, the salient differences between 
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them and their objectives. While drawing the relationship between hybrid 
warfare and grey zone conflicts, their application at various levels and the 
recommended actions to minimise their impact would be highlighted.
Changing Nature and Character of Conflicts 
There has been a progressive increase in internal armed conflicts (intra-state 
conflicts), the world over, primarily due to sectarian, ethnic and religious 
intolerance, socio-economic exclusion, feeling of inequality and injustice, 
unemployment, and non-responsive governments, unable fulfill the 
aspirations of the people. The level of violence peaked in the mid-1990s. 
Concurrently, rapid changes have been seen in the geo-political, economic, 
social, technological spheres, which has impacted the emerging geo-
strategic environment. It is surmised that due to the mutually destructive 
power of nuclear weapons and the international legal conventions, the 
probability of all-out wars between the global powers is very low. However, 
the probability of sub-conventional conflicts or limited conflicts in different 
regions, with an active role by hybrid adversaries, and the potential to 
spill over into a major conflict is high. The key feature of the security 
environment in recent years has predominantly been a range of asymmetric 
threats, which provides a greater role to the hybrid form of warfare.
The terms ‘nature of war’ and ‘character of war’ have been used 
interchangeably. Besides the military factors, the character of war keeps 
evolving due to constant changes in technology, geo-politics and geo-
economics. Carl von Clausewitz, a cavalry officer, suggests in his book, 
On War, that the capabilities, circumstances and motives of a nation-
state too have an effect on the changing nature of conflicts. On the 
other hand, traditionally, war is interactive, and is an act of violence and 
destruction. The most common type  is the attrition form of warfare. 
In simple terms, it refers to ‘force on force’, with a view to annihilate 
the opposing force. In traditional terms, war is also political in nature, 
which is generally prosecuted at the national level, with political aims and 
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objectives. Although conflicts may have political, economic or military 
objectives, wars may not necessarily always be interactive and violent. 
Moreover, warfare has continued to evolve from clear territorial wars 
with a well-defined enemy, to uncertain, ambiguous and irregular wars, 
in which information and cyber threats have gained prominence in the 
prosecution of the war. Hence, the nature of war is also changing. We 
need to also ascertain the difference between conventional and hybrid 
wars. The major difference between conventional and hybrid wars is that 
in the latter, all the available instruments of power, from the conventional 
to the non-conventional, pacification to coercion and subversion, are 
employed by both states and/or non-state actors. 
Hybrid Warfare Over the Years
A peep into history suggests that in the ancient times, the rulers or their 
Generals in Mesopotamia, Persia, Greece, Central Asia, the Mauryan 
dynasty, including military leaders like ‘Alexander, the Great’ and Genghis 
Khan, who were masters of improvisation and manoeuvre warfare, were 
always ready to use unconventional war-fighting systems and tactics in 
their campaigns. A few tools of hybrid warfare were also employed during 
the Napoleonic Wars, Mao Zedong’s protracted people’s armed conflict 
in China, and Shivaji’s campaigns against the Mughals in India. The 
essence is that most of them indulged in irregular warfare, in terms of 
both tactics and strategic aims.6
Kautilya’s Arthashastra is an ancient Indian treatise on statecraft, 
economic policy and military strategy, written in Sanskrit, about 2,300 
years ago. He has described four types of wars, which have relevance to 
the contemporary elements of national power. These wars were: 
  one, nantrayudha, or ‘war by counsel’ in which diplomatic acumen 
plays a key role to win wars; 
  two, prakasayudhais or open warfare, specifying the time and place – 
a set-piece battle;
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  three, kutayudhais, concealed warfare, which refers primarily to 
upajapa, psychological warfare, including instigation of treachery in 
the enemy camp; 
  four, tusnimyudha (gudayudha), in which ‘clandestine war’ uses covert 
methods to achieve the objective without actually waging a battle, 
usually by assassinating the enemy.7
The Arthashastra also discusses, in detail, the ‘covert activities’ of 
secret services, spies, secret agents, and clandestine activities. It specifically 
states, “Miraculous results can be achieved by practising the methods of 
subversion.”8 In the chapter on defence and war, psychological warfare 
covers the methods of propaganda by way of advertising, announcing 
the ill effects of bad omens in the enemy camp,9 to play on the cognitive 
domains of the enemy’s soldiers. Many such actions would facilitate 
easy victory, and are also similar to the modern hybrid warfare of today. 
Today’s tools are far more sophisticated and do not require the physical 
presence of the adversary at the targeted domains.
Kautilya has also prescribed the four upayas: sama, dana, bheda 
and danda—the use of all available means to achieve one’s objectives.10 
These were: sama (diplomacy, coercion or conciliation), dana (gifts, 
compensation, economic gratification), bheda (rupture, dissension, 
discontent, information or influence operations) and danda (use of 
force). It is evident from these practices that the Kautilyan concepts can 
be compared to terms such as hybrid, irregular, unrestricted, non-linear 
and grey zone warfare. These also have some relevance and similarity 
with terms like conventional and unconventional forms of warfare, covert 
operations, information operations, subversion, sabotage, deception, and 
propaganda.
Historically, it has been observed that nations, in order to achieve their 
politico-economic and strategic objectives, have continued to coin new 
terminologies based on the prevalent circumstances and situations, as they 
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affected them. They have applied various conventional or un-conventional 
techniques to achieve their national interests. Some of the terms like 
Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), low intensity operation, sub-conventional 
operation, asymmetric war, hybrid war, grey zone, unrestricted warfare, 
irregular warfare, fourth generation war, small war, non-linear, full spectrum, 
compound war, non-contact warfare, etc, have become part of the military 
vocabulary. It would be difficult to discuss all the terminologies, but they are 
similar to the roles, methods, and objectives for fighting in an asymmetric 
environment. A case in point is the term LIC, which was introduced 
by Frank Kitson in his book in 1971. It undoubtedly brought out that 
subversion and insurgency cover practically every form of disturbance, up 
to the threshold of conventional war.11 However, a study of insurgencies 
the world over suggests that subversion is a sub-set of insurgency, which 
conforms to the tenets of hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare itself has several 
terms like hybrid threats, hybrid war, hybrid influencing, hybrid adversary 
or fifth generation warfare, thus, making the understanding of the concept 
complex, and, therefore, there is no universally accepted definition of 
hybrid warfare so far. 
Varied Definitions and Perceptions
A number of strategic analysts have given certain interesting definitions 
of the term hybrid warfare, based on their perceptions and application in 
their operational environments. In 1837, Rafael Carrera had led a revolt 
that resulted in the dissolution of the Central American Federation. 
Nevertheless, “While history portrays him as a guerrilla leader, analyses 
of the actions of his forces during the insurrection point towards a form 
of hybrid warfare, a type of combat that combines classical guerrilla 
recruiting tactics and rural insurgency logistics with mostly conventional 
combat tactics and operations.”12
Frank G Hoffman, a Marine Corps officer, has written extensively on 
hybrid warfare. He explains hybrid warfare thus:
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… Hybrid wars are much more than just conflicts between states and 
other armed groups. It is the application of the various forms of conflict 
that best distinguishes hybrid threats or conflicts. This is especially 
true since hybrid wars can be conducted by both states and a variety 
of nonstate actors. Hybrid threats incorporate a full range of modes 
of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and 
formations, terrorist acts that include indiscriminate violence and 
coercion, and criminal disorder.13
Russia had successfully invaded Ukraine and Crimea in 2014, following 
the tenets of hybrid warfare. While describing the case of Russia, Alexandru 
Apetroe states that the term ‘hybrid warfare’ has been used to refer to the 
combined usage of unconventional military tactics such as conventional 
warfare with irregular warfare and cyber warfare, as well as the employment 
of other instruments and tactics (subversive elements), to achieve a double 
goal: first, to avoid responsibility and retribution; and, second to weaken 
and destabilise the enemy without direct involvement.14
Sean Sullivan writes about the use of mass communication networks—
based on the tenets of hybrid warfare—as these comprise one of the most 
powerful propaganda tools in the world:
Examples of hybrid warfare include dissemination of disinformation or 
fake news via social media, cyber-attacks on the IT systems or as the case 
in the conflict in Ukraine, disinformation and the use of anonymous 
men, dubbed ‘Little Green Men.15
Interestingly, Patrick Cullen et al., have identified the vulnerabilities 
that may be exploited:
Hybrid warfare is designed to exploit national vulnerabilities across the 
Political, Military, Economic, Social, Informational and Infrastructure 
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(PMESII) spectrum. ... This process should direct comprehensive cross-
government efforts to understand, detect and respond to hybrid threats.16
While discussing the definition, Matthew Symonds states, “Definitions 
vary, but, in essence, it is blurring of military, economic, diplomatic, 
intelligence and criminal means to achieve a political goal.”17
Based on its wide experience of asymmetric warfare and employment 
of elements of hybrid tools in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US military 
describes hybrid war as being:
…a combination of symmetrical and asymmetrical armed conflicts, 
where the intervention forces carry out traditional military operations 
against enemy military forces and targets, while acting simultaneously 
and decisively for gaining control of the indigenous population in the 
theatre of military operations, through stability operations.18
Thus, it may be fair to say that hybrid warfare is a strategy which 
employs a blend of conventional warfare, irregular warfare, disruptive 
technologies, cyber warfare, and communication networks with other 
influencing methods, such as fake news, diplomacy, and foreign electoral 
interventional methods, directly or indirectly, to achieve political, 
economic and strategic objectives. Efforts are made to synchronise the 
overall effort, but it becomes difficult due to the number of state and 
non-state actors involved. Another important feature of hybrid and grey 
zone warfare is to deny a country’s involvement in unconventional or 
clandestine activities, to prevent any further escalation. Peter Pindjack of 
the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs at the Slovak Republic, has 
identified the target places where hybrid war takes place and opines that 
“a hybrid war takes place on three distinct battlefields: the conventional 
battlefield, the indigenous population of the conflict zone, and the 
international community.”19
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To take preventive actions and to counter unconventional threats, 
the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats has 
been established in Helsinki. Reid Standish, a special correspondent with 
Foreign Policy, gives the rationale for the establishment of the centre, 
which, in essence, also describes the elements of hybrid threats:
…It was created to find new ways to defend against hybrid warfare: the 
blending of diplomacy, politics, media, cyberspace, and military force to 
destabilize and undermine an opponent’s government.20
In the latest series of Oriental Review, an open dialogue 
research journal, Andrew Korybko, a specialist on hybrid warfare, 
has formulated the “Law of Hybrid War” which states that“[t]he 
grand objective behind every Hybrid War is to disrupt multi-polar 
transnational connective projects through externally provoked identity 
conflicts (ethnic, religious, regional, political, etc.) within a targeted 
transit state.”21 Similarly, while discussing the possibility of threats to 
both the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and European 
Union (EU), Ivo Pickner argues, ‘‘It means that a hybrid threat is 
not exclusively a tool of asymmetric or non-state actors, but can be 
applied by state and non-state actors alike”22 (Refer Fig 1). A few more 
elements can be added to the list like transnational forces abetting 
insurgencies, violence, organised crime and terrorism, support to 
political parties, religious extremism, etc.
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Fig 1: Elements of Hybrid War
Source: Hybrid War as a Modern Instrument of Military Art23
Hybrid Warfare and Grey Zone Conflicts
In the recent years, two terms—hybrid warfare and grey zone 
conflicts—have been added to the glossary of terms of International 
Relations (IR) and conflicts, which are discussed briefly. Warfare has 
graduated to the fifth generation in the form of hybrid warfare. It has 
been used in the conflicts in West Asia, Afghanistan, Ukraine, China, 
South Asia, the USA and many other areas of conflict. Greg Grant 
is emphatic when he says that, as part of situational awareness, it is 
easier to know about own troops, but it does not solve the problem of 
finding the “low signature” enemy.24 The most potent threats emanate 
from the information and cyber domains: espionage, attack and 
manipulation. These can affect a large portion of the population in a 
short time. Although, the Indian subcontinent continues to face sub-
conventional war in the form of proxy war and cross-border terrorism, 
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it has not experienced the full dimension of hybrid war in the true 
sense of the term so far. 
Grey zone conflicts, on the other hand, are conflicts which 
oscillate between war and peace and are generally waged by the great 
powers that do not want to cross the threshold of a total war due to 
the nuclear threat,25 and yet aim to achieve their political and territorial 
objectives. It may perhaps be correct to say that it is also waged by a 
nation against a powerful adversary, to remain ambiguous, uncertain and 
below the threshold of an open conflict. In the grey zone, the moves 
are carefully calibrated to ensure that the situation remains ambiguous 
and uncertain.26 Mark Galeotti has described the grey zone concept as 
“guerrilla geopolitics”.27
While looking at the future, grey zone conflicts between the great 
powers will continue to be relevant for both the domination of strategic 
space and heightened competition for fast diminishing natural resources. 
While the hybrid warfare concept covers a much wider canvass, with 
a larger kitty of tools, the grey zone uses them selectively to oscillate 
between the grey zones of war and peace. Two distinctive examples of 
grey zone conflicts are Russia’s intervention in Ukraine in 2014, and 
China’s progressive, skillful increase in assertive actions in the South 
China Sea (SCS), by creating artificial islands to deploy Surface-to-Air 
Missiles (SAMs) and anti-ship missiles, and establishing security posts on 
the reclaimed islands.28 Although, these activities are in the realm of the 
grey zone, they certainly point toward employment of hybrid threats. 
Subsequently, China has continued to conduct major naval and air 
exercises in the SCS, suggesting to America that any intervention would 
be “more risky and more costly.”29 The lines among military, economic, 
diplomatic, intelligence and criminal means of aggression are becoming 
increasingly blurred.
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Increase in Hybrid Warfare
Hybrid threats have become predominant due to a number of reasons: 
one, the changing nature of the world order and the security matrix at 
the global and regional levels; two, the fourth industrial revolution—the 
fusion of technologies—in which technologies have developed at a very 
rapid pace and international norms and regulatory mechanisms have still 
not been established, e.g., for cyber, space and lethal autonomous weapon 
systems; three, technology has provided new tools and has empowered 
the state and non-state actors to achieve their objectives at much lower 
costs; four, information warfare, due to increased digitalisation, internet 
and social media influences that can change the perceptions of the target 
population in a much quicker timeframe; five, in counter-insurgency 
operations, asymmetry between the strength of a state and its enormous 
resources, against the will of the insurgents to fight for their cause has 
been facilitated by the availability of the latest technology. With the advent 
of new technology, digitalisation or the usage of the virtual sphere has not 
only provided a wide range of tools to easily and quickly propagate a fear 
psychosis among the masses but has also lowered the cost of achieving 
one’s goals and objectives. 
The fourth major industrial revolution has resulted in blurring 
the lines among the physical, digital and biological spheres.30 The new 
technologies like: the Internet of Things (IoT), cyber security, simulation, 
lethal autonomous weapon systems, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and big 
data, augmented reality, cloud computing, addictive manufacturing 
and 3-D printing would play a key role in organising non-contact and 
non-kinetic forms of warfare to achieve objectives. These technologies 
are already providing the architectural support for hybrid threats and 
challenges to security, which should be exploited, both to counter them 
as also to employ them to our advantage in a proactive manner. 
Moreover, hybrid warfare, also known as ambiguous warfare, 
generally pivots around political, economic and military objectives. It is 
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a blend of the realms of the economy, military, information, psychology 
and cyber, with a view to achieve political objectives.31 The range of 
hybrid tools continues to increase with changes in the geo-political 
environment, new innovations in technologies and new ideas to serve 
one’s national interests. A few of these elements and tools put together 
are: conventional warfare, irregular warfare, economic leverage, cyber 
warfare, cyber tools (espionage, attack, manipulation),information 
warfare, special operations, strategic leaks, subversion, propaganda, fake 
news, psychological operations, public information campaign, influence 
operations, funding various organisations, organised protests movements, 
transnational abetment of violence based on sectarian, ethnic and religious 
intolerance, operations by proxies, and radicalisation based on religious 
extremism. Information and cyber warfare are central to hybrid warfare. 
Cases of Hybrid Warfare and Impact
Several countries have been affected by hybrid threats over the years, by 
both state and non-state actors, or a combination of the two. Only a 
few cases have been discussed. Some of the recent examples, published 
and spoken about at various forums, are the Russian ‘ little green men’ 
in Ukraine; Russian hacks into the e-mail server of the US Democratic 
National Committee (DNC); the protest and counter-protest over the 
mosque in Houston, with both sides fake and organised by Russian trolls. 
Gregory Treverton et al. have described these as the “hybrid threats in 
the 21st century.”32 Considering the financial vulnerabilities of Ukraine, 
the Russian military actions were closely linked with political, economic 
and information campaigns.33
Similar to this, although its claims on a number of islands and 
territorial waters in the South China Sea (SCS) are disputed by several 
neighbours, China has built progressively militarised artificial islands 
in the SCS during the past decade. This remains part of the grey zone 
conflict with hybrid threats. To quote Gregory F. Treverton, “China has 
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concentrated on cyber tools, pursuing some combination of espionage, 
signalling capabilities or preparing to add cyber friction in the event of 
conflict.”34 Even the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Hezbollah 
and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have used the elements and mix of 
conventional and unconventional methods, symmetrical and asymmetrical 
tactics and capabilities for their violent actions and terror. Conflict in 
Yemen is another example of multifaceted hybrid warfare, where the 
Houthis, who were fighting primarily for a greater share of power, have 
“employed both kinetic and non-kinetic force to control the state and its 
socio-economic policies.”35 The Houthis have withstood the campaigns 
by the Yemeni armed forces since 2004, and the Saudi-led coalition that 
carried out ground and air attacks, and naval blockades, periodically since 
March 2015. Recently, the Houthis claimed to have attacked the two 
major oil fields of Saudi Arabia by a swarm of armed drones and missiles 
on September 14, 2019—a new form of unmanned armed attacks though 
not the first of the kind in the world.
Closer home, the actions of Pakistan are examples of what is now 
being termed as grey zone conflict and/or hybrid threats. These have 
been discussed very briefly. Since its independence in August 1947, 
Pakistan has remained obsessed with the idea of annexation of Jammu 
and Kashmir (J&K) with it. On October 22, 1947, as part of detailed 
planning, Pakistan launched 20 lashkars of Pathan tribal warriors from 
the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) into J&K, with a few retired 
officers from the Pakistan Army to guide the lashkars to achieve the 
ultimate aim of annexing J&K. The tribesmen were more adept at guerrilla 
war than infantry-style battles.36 It was called Operation Gulmarg, an 
unconventional operation to keep it below the threshold of an open 
war with India, which was much stronger militarily. The Pakistan Army 
entered the war in 1948. Eventually, Pakistan failed. 
Having not learnt a lesson, Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar 
by infiltrating the Pakistan Army’s Azad Kashmir Regular Force (AKRF), 
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disguised as locals, into Baramulla, Uri, Gulmarg and other areas J&K, in 
August 1965. The aim was to foment an uprising with the support of the 
local people and annex J&K, with the intervention of the regular Army at 
an opportune moment. Pakistan had launched the AKRF, to be followed 
by the regular Army. While the covert multi-pronged infiltration plan and 
abetment of an uprising failed, it led to the Indo-Pak War of 1965. Once 
again, Pakistan failed in its mission. 
With its experience of the role of the Mujahideen in Afghanistan 
since 1980, where they were supported, equipped and funded by the US, 
Pakistan indulged in proxy war-cum-cross-border terrorism in the Kashmir 
Valley in the late 1980s, which subsequently spread to the adjoining areas 
south of the Pir Panjal Range (PPR). Pakistan has continued to provide 
diplomatic, military, political, financial, propaganda and psychological 
support to the terrorists, including a large number of jihadists who 
came from the Middle East in the 1990s. The aim was to destabilise 
India by the doctrine and announcement of “bleeding India with a 
thousand cuts”.37 In 1999, Pakistan sent its regular troops (Northern 
Light Infantry), dressed in local attire, to deceitfully occupy the Kargil 
Heights, but announced to the world that they were Mujahideen. This 
was yet another way of unleashing hybrid war to achieve its multiple aims. 
The operation was a political, diplomatic and strategic failure. However, 
keeping in view its larger strategic objectives, Pakistan has been successful 
on several counts by employing appropriate hybrid tools in a calibrated 
manner against India.
It is common knowledge that Pakistan sponsored terrorist groups 
like the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), Hizbul 
Mujahideen (HM) and many others, carried out attacks in the hinterland 
at Mumbai, Delhi, Jammu, Varanasi, Uri, Samba, Pathankot, Nagrota, 
Sanjuwan and Pulwama with the aim of destroying the very idea of 
India. The terrorists attacked the financial hub (Mumbai) a number of 
times, religious places of worship to cause communal disharmony, the 
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Information Technology (IT) hubs, and the Parliament of the country 
– the symbol of democracy of the country. Being fully aware of India’s 
growing economic and military strength as an emerging power, Pakistan 
resorted to the basic tenets of grey zone conflict, employing hybrid tools 
in terms of providing diplomatic, military, political, financial, religious, 
propaganda and psychological support to destabilise India.
Way Ahead
As a concept, a combination of the conventional and unconventional 
systems of war-fighting, regular and irregular, overt and covert operations, 
at strategic and tactical levels, is as old as the history of warfare itself. 
Everyone understands that the security landscape is becoming increasingly 
complex, multi-layered and multi-dimensional, but it is becoming more 
and more difficult to understand the threats being faced by nation-states. 
As part of their strategy, hybrid adversaries study the critical political-
economic-social-military structural vulnerabilities, and plan to target 
them by varied hybrid elements and tools. In fact, the nature and intensity 
of threats keep changing, based on innovative ideas and technological 
advancements. Therefore, it is important to first keep abreast with the 
technological tools, understand and assess the nature and intensity of the 
threats and vulnerabilities, and the impact on one’s national security. 
Given the current tempo of conflicts the world over, it would be 
correct to agree with Margaret Bond about the role of all elements 
of national power. According to Bond, “War of the next century will 
comprise a kind of hybrid war, projecting all elements of national power 
along a continuum of activities from stability, security, and reconstruction 
operations, to armed combat.”38 The capabilities of both state and the 
non-state actors to engage in hybrid warfare differ, but remain the most 
potent threat. As hybrid warfare is primarily well-equipped and designed 
to exploit national vulnerabilities across the political, military, economic, 
social, informational and infrastructural spectra, it virtually means that it 
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comprises war against nation-states. India continues to be vulnerable to 
hybrid threats, being a large, pluralistic, democratic nation, with a huge 
diversity in geography, demographic profile, socio-economic disparity, 
and other forms and manifestations. As there is no declared war, the rules 
of war have also changed. Thus, in the future, we will be increasingly 
confronted with non-kinetic and non-contact forms of threats, which 
will be far more potent and lethal. It is a fact that no single element of 
national power – certainly, not the military alone—can address the hybrid 
threats of the future. There is, therefore, a need to change our ‘mindset’ 
from conventional conflict alone to a combination of conventional-cum-
non-conventional methods to combat the hybrid threats of the future. 
There is a need to create organisations at the apex level—the Centre—to 
plan and synergise the activities of various organs of the state, to respond 
to such situations. Also, the integration of the Centre with the states 
would be central to our preparation for such hybrid threats. Thus, along 
with logistical and military preparedness, there is a need for political and 
diplomatic level preparedness at all stages as well, and all these preparations 
need to be in sync with each other if the country has to combat hybrid 
threats. 
With varied hybrid elements, particularly information and cyber 
warfare, gaining prominence to target the conventional battlefield 
and the indigenous population of the conflict zone, there is a need to 
develop a strong intelligence system, with survivability and redundancy, 
to identify the emanating threats and take proactive actions to mitigate 
them. We also have to address the international community proactively 
to counter the propaganda narratives of the adversaries. A case in point: 
cyber attacks by an adversary could paralyse the economy, governance, 
banking, transportation systems, and military networks. Since the 
indigenous population is one of the primary targets of hybrid adversaries 
we have to promote awareness about the adversary’s designs and threats 
to all sections of the society, including higher educational institutions 
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such as private, state and central universities. Such institutes should 
remain vigilant to report activities that may lead to subversion, abetment 
of people’s movements, terrorist attacks, organised crime, radicalisation, 
recruitment for religious extremism/anti-national activities, and 
misinformation campaigns that lower the morale of the population at large. 
Simultaneously, the intelligence and police forces must be restructured, 
trained and equipped with modern tools to fight the emanating threats. 
One of the most prominent players comprise the armed forces. 
Besides the need for synergy amongst them, they should also carry out a 
de novo study of their capabilities and effectiveness in hybrid or grey zone 
scenarios. It would certainly point to reviewing our doctrines, strategies, 
war-fighting concepts, command and control structures, intelligence at 
different levels, and the need to build matching capabilities. Just as Israel 
learnt its lessons in its war with Hezbollah in 2006, and carried out a 
review to fight against hybrid threats, India should also prepare for these 
with a sense of urgency. We, as a nation, should be prepared to fight 
a high intensity war along with the unconventional and hybrid threats. 
Therefore, a counter hybrid warfare strategy will be successful only if it 
can effectively synchronise the political, economic, military, social, cyber 
and informational warfare tools to defeat the hybrid adversaries in time. 
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